THE PRODUCT PLAN / MADE TANGIBLE

Trust is a condition.
Keep checking it.

A local agent checks the device. Policy decides who can communicate. People review the evidence.

Browser-local simulation · all mesh controls are planned.
No device or network is connected. No encryption or security check runs here.

STUDIO / SAMPLE ORGANISATION
SIMULATION · NOT LIVE

ENGINEERING / NODE 01

studio-mac-01

compliant
Driver registration
Registered · approved v0.1 (sample)
Sample fingerprint · epoch 04
7C2A · 91F0 · B8D3 · 4E60
A key advertisement alone does not establish trust.
A2A blocked in simulation

A2A is off. Organisation and both node opt-ins are required before policy checks can allow a message.

Heartbeat ≠ permissionActive subscription and current authorisation lease are fixed sample assumptions.

OPERATIONS / NODE 02

ops-agent-02

compliant · sample
Recipient scope
Same organisation · approved peer
Sample fingerprint · epoch 02
D110 · 6B8E · 22A4 · 90CF
Authorised audience is fixed in this example.
Repair path · separate from A2A

Re-evaluate evidence, request approved remediation or complete work sign-in. A blocked node cannot use repair access to send A2A messages.

Planned communication filter: only approved message types, peers and audiences pass. Unknown fields, expired messages and replays are denied. Peer reports are evidence for review; they cannot execute commands, change policy or blacklist another node. Planned private messages: the sender encrypts to an authenticated recipient public key. The recipient decrypts locally; its private key never leaves the device. Message encryption keys are distinct from report signing keys. Identity, roles and compliance still apply. Fingerprints above are illustrative abbreviations.

ORDINARY PEER VIEW

Work profile matches policy · fresh evidence

Bounded evidence shared with the sample permitted audience.

AUTHORISED REVIEWER / SAMPLE ROLE

Authorised reviewer

Work profile matches policy · fresh evidenceRestricted visibility never exempts a device from checks. Real audience changes would require authorisation and an audit record.

3. TEST THE TRUST BOUNDARY

Evidence can be challenged.

Planned Chap audit bridge · advisory review only. No actual signature verification runs here.

  1. Sample policy loaded. No network access granted.
01

Check

Identify supported processes and registered drivers. Collect bounded evidence; unknown stays unknown.

02

Maintain

Recheck continuously. Apply only approved repairs; work sign-in still needs the member. Preserve explicit declines.

03

Communicate

Authorise each message or short-lived session against tenant, audience, peer identity, approved driver and fresh evidence.

04

Audit

Give scoped reviewers evidence. Chap may flag suspected poisoning with provenance; accusations never grant blacklist authority.

AVAILABLE NOW / LOCAL POLICY DRAFTS

Bring your own agent.

Give your agent the admin skill and schema. It can inspect authorised configuration and suggest organisation defaults for you to review.

JSON Schema 2020-12, with TypeScript types and runtime validation from one definition. The helper does not enrol devices or apply settings.

FROM PLAN TO PRACTICE

Start with your organisation.

The free founder preview saves your rollout plan. Device collection, the mesh and enforcement remain in development.